As of April 1st, our 2019 safety record is holding steady with just the one fatal accident out in the Kingman area in January.
The following is the NTSB official report:
On January 13, 2019, about 1045 mountain standard time, a Piper PA22-160 airplane, N9227D, was substantially damaged when it impacted mountainous terrain in the Hualapai County Park, Hualapai, Arizona under unknown circumstances. The student pilot received serious injuries, and the owner/non-pilot rated passenger received fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Unknown daylight meteorological conditions existed at the accident site about the time of the accident. No flight plan was filed for the flight, and no records of any pilot pre-flight briefing were discovered. The flight had reportedly originated from Kingman Airport (IGM), Kingman Arizona about 44 minutes prior to the accident.
The accident site was located about 9.5 miles south-southeast of IGM. According to first responders, the pilot reported that the engine had lost power. No additional details were provided, and the pilot has refused to communicate with either NTSB or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) investigators.
According to the passenger's sister, the passenger had purchased the airplane for the pilot, and the airplane was kept in a rented hangar at Earnest A. Love Field (PRC), Prescott, Arizona. The pilot and passenger flew from PRC to Meadview, Arizona the day before the accident in order to attend a party. The next morning they flew from Meadview to IGM. The sister reported that the airplane was refueled at IGM, and that at 1001 she received a text from the passenger reporting that the two had taken off from IGM. The fueling records at IGM neither confirmed nor contradicted the sister's refueling account.
FAA records indicated that the pilot had been issued a student pilot certificate in January 2014, and was never issued any other certificates. Despite multiple attempts, no pilot training records, flight experience logs, or airplane maintenance records were able to be located by investigators.
PROJECTED SAFETY PROGRAMS THROUGH JUNE:
APRIL 13TH – FLAGSTAFF – 0900 at the Wiseman Aviation hangar
MAY 4th - PAYSON - 0900 location to be announced
MAY 11th - Yuma - 0900 in the Airport conference room
MAY 18TH - APA Annual meeting 10:00 am Casino Arizona, East 101 at E. Mc Kellips
MAY 25th - ASU facility at IWA, time and location to be announced
JUNE 8TH - SW Aviation Weather Symposium, Tempe, location TBD
JUNE 15TH - PRESCOTT @ ERAU 0900, Davis Learning Center
Watch for announcements on FAASAFETY.GOV to register, or you can always just walk in and join in the fun.
Your ADS-B Questions Answered: (Facts here copied from the FAA “BLAST” article dated 3/21/2019)
So how do I obtain initial approval for my ADS-B Out system?
Initial ADS-B Out system pairings (transmitter/GPS) must be approved for installation using the Type Certificate (TC), Amended TC (ATC), or Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) process. Aircraft and equipment manufacturers, and others seeking initial pairing approval should consult their Aircraft Certification Office to determine the appropriate approval process for these initial installations. Once the performance of the initial pairing has been established, the FAA considers follow-on installations of the same pairing to be approved.
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) holders can issue an ATC and an STC when authorized by their FAA Organization Management Team (OMT). Equipment manufacturers are the best source for previously approved pairing information. The FAA also maintains a list of approved pairings at the following link: https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/equipadsb/installation/equipment/adsb_ready/
After initial approval, can applicable ADS-B Out systems be installed on aircraft not covered by that approval?
Yes, ADS-B Out systems that have previously received FAA approval and meet all of the conditions listed in the FAA’s policy memo on Installation Approval for ADS-B OUT Systems (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/1fdea629cd029a7c86257f7900601653/$FILE/AFS-360_2016-03-02.pdf), may be installed and returned to service on other aircraft without further data approval.
Please note that if an Approved Model List (AML) STC is available that provides for the installation of specific ADS-B transmitter and GPS pairings on listed aircraft, consider using the data from that AML STC for the ADS-B Out system installation.
What is the single most common ADS-B Out installation problem?
The single most common ADS-B Out installation problem is incorrect configuration of the flight identification code. Currently, more than 600 ADS-B Out equipped aircraft are operating with a misconfigured flight identification code with no other equipment issues. For general aviation, the flight identification code is configured in ADS-B equipment to transmit the aircraft’s assigned N-number (e.g., N1234). However, many misconfigured aircraft are transmitting flight identification codes with missing alphanumeric characters (1234 vs N1234, N123 vs N1234), no flight identification code (no data entered during installation), improper characters (???????), all zeros (000000), and others simply have a single character transposed (N1235 vs N1234).
You can verify that your aircraft is transmitting the correct flight identification code by requesting a Public ADS-B Performance Report at the following web address:
https://adsbperformance.faa.gov/PAPRRequest.aspx. Ensure the Tail Number and Last Flight ID on the cover page of the report match.
For more information on what to consider before and after installation of your ADS-B Out system, go to: https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/equipadsb/installation.
The Installation Approval for ADS-B Out Systems (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/1FDEA629CD029A7C86257F7900601653?OpenDocument) memo explains the FAA's policy regarding installation of ADS-B Out systems into civil aircraft.
You can also read several ADS-B related articles in the January/February 2019 issue of FAA Safety Briefing available at https://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing, including Is My ADS-B Broadcasting Me: A Look at Non-Performing Emitters (http://bit.ly/adsbemitter) and Clearing the Crypto-Fog: Tips for Decoding and Deciding Among ADS-B Equipment options (http://bit.ly/adsbequip).
There’s less than 10 months remaining before the January 1, 2020 ADS-B Out equipage deadline. For more information, please visit the Equip ADS-B website at www.faa.gov/nextgen/equipadsb/.
Don’t get left in the hangar. Equip now!
NTSB fatal accident final determination:
Back in 2017, GAARMS discussed the fatal crash of an RV-7 that departed the Buckeye airport on a pleasure flight and then crashed down by Arlington, AZ. At the time, it was a mysterious crash, with no eye witnesses or logical explanation. The following is the final determination by the NTSB, and it is most interesting; you need to read this. Flying has its potential risks, but sometimes fate really is the hunter!
The airline transport pilot and private pilot-rated passenger were in cruise flight when radar contact was lost. Wreckage and impact signatures revealed that the airplane impacted the ground in an inverted, left-wing-down, nose-down attitude. The cockpit canopy, vertical stabilizer, and rudder were found about 1 mile from the main wreckage. Examination of the engine found no abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the airframe revealed biological matter in a dented section underneath the horizontal stabilizer, as well as bird feathers in the cockpit under the passenger seat. DNA and microscopic examination of the specimens were consistent with a rock pigeon. All fracture surfaces examined were consistent with overstress failure; there were no indications of any preexisting damage such as cracks or corrosion. The fracture surfaces of the spars, skins, stabilizers, and other components from the horizontal stabilizer, vertical stabilizer, and rudder assemblies exhibited features consistent with secondary fractures (such as from ground impact or after the bird strike). There were no clear indications that any of the components that fractured in overstress did so prior to ground impact or independently of the bird strike.
It is possible that the pilot made an evasive maneuver before or during impact with the bird, that in combination, resulted in an overstress structural failure of the, vertical stabilizer and rudder, which in turn resulted in the pilot's inability to maintain control of the airplane.
Probable Cause and Findings
The NTSB determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The inflight overstress separation of the vertical stabilizer and rudder during flight which resulted in the pilot's inability to maintain airplane control. Contributing to the accident was an inflight collision with a bird.